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The hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War (The Great War as it was once called, and as it is against referred to more 
frequently today) is an opportunity for the modern world to once again 
focus its attention on the beginning of the war that was one of the largest 
tectonic shifts in modern history. These shifts marked the beginning of the 
twentieth century, and paved the way for — and perhaps even caused — 
many of the evils of that century and left consequences which can still be 
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felt. Moreover, the claim that this war, from the aspect of the consequences, 
has still not ended in some parts of the world is not entirely unconvincing. 
What were the causes of the First World War? How and why did it break 
out? Could it have been prevented? Is there a guilty party or multiple guilty 
parties, regardless of whether it is an individual or a nation? Even a hundred 
years after the beginning of the 1914 catastrophe, as it is referred to in the 
title of one of the books covered by this review, we are still uncertain about 
the answers to these questions, and also being re-examined are some of the 
conventional wisdoms about the beginning of the military conflict.
Quite expectedly, this many open issues on the centennial of the First 
World War has led to the appearance of a large number of publications 
on the topic of its beginning and the causes that led to it. All these works, 
written in English in order, among other reasons, to reach a maximum audi-
ence, are big commercial publishing undertakings. Consequently, these are 
not books that are intended for the expert audience of dedicated historians, 
which would be published in the few journals covering this field, and which 
would be the topic of conferences far removed from the eyes of the media 
and the public. These are books which are sold in large numbers, which have 
to reach general readers and have a social impact far beyond the circles of 
dedicated professionals. This is why the authors, even if they wanted to do 
it differently, had no choice and needed to adapt their manner of presenta-
tion and writing style to educated non-specialists, such as the author of this 
review. All the books listed in this review are easy to read, they hold the 
reader’s attention, and can almost, at least in some cases, be compared to 
well-penned fiction. Searching for ways to attract a wide circle of readers, 
i.e. to hold on to them, the authors occasionally sought analogies between 
events a hundred years ago and the present events. The examples used were 
relatively recently headline news and can hold the attention of contempo-
rary (Western) readers, who are not so interested in, for example, the situa-
tion in Bosnia or Serbia a hundred years ago, and perhaps are unable to keep 
their attention for a longer period of time on anything that is not related 
to September 11, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan or at least Hezbollah. Nonethe-
less, such an approach can hardly be accepted from a methodological point 
of view — therefore there are inevitably errors when value judgements are 
made on someone’s role in the past based on common present-day value 
models, especially in the Western world, where the largest number of the 
readers of these books lives. The result is, for example, the parallel drawn 
between Young Bosnia and present-day Islamic fundamentalists, or the par-
allel between contemporary Serbia and present-day Iran, regardless of its 
being poorly substantiated by facts, in a situation where the media image of 
present-day Iran (with or without reason) is completely negative, causing, 
i.e. calling for such a view of Serbia from a different time.
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Also, secondary historical sources are mainly used with well-known 
facts only being interpreted in new ways — seeking new points of view. 
There is no magic wand, except in the case of MacMillan, at least to some 
extent; there are no new documents that shed completely new light on the 
period a century ago. This is quite understandable — most of the mining 
work has been done in the past hundred years. One should be empathetic 
to those who are disappointed that documents have not been unearthed 
unambigously blaming or exonerating any of the sides of the historical guilt, 
but unfortunately for them this is simply how things are and one should ac-
cept it. This is especially true since during completely unrestrained access to 
the Serbian archives on two occasions (1915–1918 and 1941–1944) noth-
ing was found that would unquestionably link the Serbian authorities to the 
assassination in Sarajevo.
Consequently it is quite expected that present-day historiographic 
literature is to a great extent reduced to re-examining facts and observing 
them in a new light.  It is interesting, however, what this new light does. 
Clark, for example, makes it clear that this new light consists of the things 
that have transpired in the meantime, especially present-day events that 
still occupy the attention of the general public. For instance, Clark claims 
that today, being aware of all the difficulties that the European Union is 
facing, we have far greater sympathy for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
and he also claims that following the events in Srebrenica and the siege of 
Sarajevo, we have far less understanding for Serbian national liberation in 
the early twentieth century, and it becomes more difficult to consider Serbia 
as the object or victim of the politics of the Great Powers. It seems that the 
issue of the justification of the placement of events of a hundred years ago 
in such a context remains open. This is supported by the fact that the same 
author does not offer any explanation of contemporary events, but only lists 
them, and, for example, he does not provide a comparative analysis of the 
sources of the structural problems of the European Union and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. This would undoubtedly be interesting and relevant, 
but he stops at the declaration that today we have more sympathies for 
the latter. Regardless of the fact that in respect to sympathies it seems that 
Clark unjustifiably transformed the first person singular into the first per-
son plural, one should point out that historiography as a science still aims 
to comprehend reality as it was once, and not to comprehend its values and 
express sympathies from the standpoint of present-day dominant values, 
whatever they may be.
Even more interesting is the process in which present-day events 
are used as a benchmark for the evaluation and even justification of past 
events — a process that Clark uses by comparatively analysing the Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum issued to Serbia in 1914 and the so-called peace offer 
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(proposed agreement) in Rambouillet in 1999, and claims that terms of the 
issued ultimatum were more lenient.1 Regardless of whether this is true, 
it has nothing in common with the nature of the 1914 ultimatum. Worst 
of all, such a process does not allow us to understand the behaviour of the 
interested parties in either case, nor do we learn anything more than the 
incentives that the decision makers were exposed to, especially bearing in 
mind that much had changed in international relations during the eight 
decades that separate the two events. If nothing else, we are richer for the 
collective experience of nearly a hundred years. And what an experience it 
is — the experience of world wars, the Holocaust, Nazism, Communism, 
in short, the darkest totalitarianism, the atomic bomb, and the world on the 
brink of nuclear war. Can it be that all this does not affect how each of us 
thinks, regardless of who it is that is making a particular decision.
Regardless of the rather loud cries surrounding it, the revision of his-
toriography is quite a natural process. It is not necessary for new documents 
to be discovered — old ones can be interpreted in new alternative ways, and 
the question is not whether historiography is being revised, but whether 
such a revision will allow us to better understand the past and consequently 
to better understand the time that we live in and the world around us. How-
ever, in the case of the First World War the revision is specific, as Mom-
bauer clearly demonstrates, since the issue of German guilt for the war had 
become a political issue in that country even during the war (apparently the 
main German participants had no illusions about their own roles or about 
the outcome of the war), and especially after the Treaty of Versailles and the 
consequently determined German war guilt, as the basis for war reparations. 
Since Germany was in the focus of global attention one more time during 
the twentieth century (this time there was no dilemma about its war guilt), 
the issue was raised as to whether Nazism was the natural continuance of 
German (primarily Prussian) militarism, or a strange aberration that oc-
curred under extremely specific circumstances in the Weimar Republic. In 
fact, if Germany was not to blame for the First World War, then the thesis 
about the continuity of German militarism and authoritarianism loses its 
credibility — then Hitler would not have been part of German political 
tradition, but rather happened to be head of state by pure chance.
It is likely that the last great revision of historiography, i.e. the last 
great revolution in the interpretation of the causes of the First World War 
1 In addition to the book that is being reviewed, this comparison, for completely un-
known reasons, can be found in Clark’s biography of Emperor Wilhelm II. The char-
acter of the causality link between the Kaiser and the conference in Rambouillet truly 
remains a mystery. See Christopher Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II, A Life in Power (Penguin 
Books, 2009), 304.
B. Begović, In Search of Lost Time 457
occurred in Germany with the Fischer controversy, since the new documents 
that Fischer discovered,2 including the so-called September Program,3 led 
to scientific as well as non-scientific conflicts, primarily in the Federal (at 
the time western) Republic of Germany. It was not only science that was 
in question, as demonstrated by Mombauer, but rather the debate included 
categories of treason, national consciousness and all other categories that 
are under no circumstances part of academic debate. The reviewed books, 
with the exception of Hastings to a certain degree, and Fromkin in a specific 
manner, do not accept Fischer’s original thesis, that a clear German strat-
egy existed, i.e. a consistent political plan to place Europe under German 
domination4 through war, and in keeping with the tradition of Prussian 
militarism and state formation. However, this in itself does not mean that 
there is no German war guilt, i.e. that Germany did not want to start the 
war, regardless of the stated goal.
However, let us start chronologically, from the newest books, to those 
that were published somewhat earlier. Margaret MacMillan’s book is not 
only the newest but is certainly the most encompassing, it is the only truly 
comprehensive book among those reviewed. The structure of the book cor-
responds to what the author sets as her goal, which is to answer the question 
why peace ended, not why war started. Namely, in the year that the First 
World War broke out Europe celebrated a hundred years of unprecedented 
peace (with smaller incidents such as the Crimean War and the Franco-
Prussian War). It was a period of unmatched technological, economic and 
social progress. The book starts with this new Europe in 1900, and the Ex-
2 Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldof: Droste Verlag und Druckerei 
GmbH, 1961). Translated into English as Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New 
York: W.W.Norton, 2007 [1967]).
3 According to the program, one of the German war objectives was “We must create 
a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include 
France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Swe-
den and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme 
authority and all its members will be normally equal, but in practice will be under 
German leadership and must stabilise Germany’s economic dominance over Mitteleu-
ropa”, quoted Nail Ferguson, The Pity of War 1914–1918 (London: The Allen Lane, The 
Penguin Press,  1998),  171. The title of Ferguson’s chapter The Kaiser’s European Union, 
although not so much the content, focuses on proving that entering the 1914 war was 
a strategic mistake on the part of Great Britain, indicating the possibility of similarities 
between the present-day EU and German war objectives in 1914.
4 The existence of a German war plan, better know as the Schlieffen Plan, is beyond 
any reasonable doubt, though in this respect there have been certain exceptions lately, 
although not very convoncing. See Terence Zuber, The Real German War Plan 1904–14 
(Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2011).
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position Universelle in Paris that year, and the author claims that the con-
cept of playing with a zero-sum was abandoned in international relations at 
that time, with the dominant concept being that the sum can be increased 
through cooperation. However, MacMillan takes us back to the roots of 
that Europe, the strongest being the unification of Germany three decades 
earlier, as well as the absence of Bismarck and Germany’s departure from 
his concept of partial and balanced alliances with its neighbours, primarily 
Russia.
MacMillan repeats in several places that war was not unavoidable 
and she builds the explanation why it did in fact occur by arranging pieces 
into a mosaic: the forming of alliances led to the establishment of a bipolar 
world, the world of opposed alliances that went to war. The book reviews 
the history of Anglo-French, Anglo-Russian, Franco-Russian and Austro-
German relations. Each of the big players had their own strategic interests 
and the author thoroughly analyses the strategic thinking of each of them, 
which led precisely to such, and not some other alliances. At the same time 
the biggest players are playing their strategic games throughout the already 
globalised world, and the Anglo-Russian “big game” was played in the foot-
hills of the Himalayas and in China, and the Anglo-French — in the Su-
dan, Indochina and Central Africa.
MacMillan covers all the significant international crises that preced-
ed the outbreak of the First World War and clearly shows that war did not 
occur out of the blue, but rather that tensions were clearly visible. Both the 
first and second Moroccan crises, the Italian occupation of Libya, the an-
nexation of Bosnia, the Balkan Wars, the Eastern Question, which was the 
name at the time for everything that came with the weakening and breakup 
of the Ottoman Empire — these are all crises that were, in present-day 
financial jargon, the stress-tests of peace in Europe at the time. Europe 
survived all the stress-tests until the assassination in Sarajevo. And had it 
not failed that stress-test, it probably would have failed the next one — it is 
quite clear from MacMillan’s account.
Great attention is rightfully given to the Anglo-German naval arms 
race, as the likely crucial single factor that led to war, and accordingly an 
analysis is presented of the strategic impact of this race on what created 
the basis for Britain indeed opting for an alliance with France and Rus-
sia, and ultimately entering the war against Germany. MacMillan clearly 
shows how this coerced and needless German move led to the alienation 
of Great Britain, as Germany’s natural ally (Germany’s domination of the 
continent was not a threat to British maritime domination, and vice versa). 
And MacMillan uses this example to analyse the way the German military 
and political elite made (wrong) decisions. Many things are apparent in 
this arms race: the unclear strategic thinking, the superficial knowledge of 
B. Begović, In Search of Lost Time 459
the other side, and the poor prediction of its reactions, huge ambition and 
rather erroneous reasoning.
The author has an interesting approach, which was also applied in her 
previous books,5 where history is reviewed by considering the individuals 
who made key decisions. Therefore we get suggestive portraits of the po-
litical and military elite of the period, such as genuine pacifist and diligent 
politician, French socialist Jean Jaurès, but also the not exactly perfectly bal-
anced personality of Wilhelm II, the depression prone Helmut von Moltke 
the Younger (Chief of the German General Staff ), or colourful, to put it 
mildly, Conrad von Hötzendorf (Chief of the Austrian General Staff ). On 
all sides there was evidently a rather small breadth in thinking, a lack of 
inventiveness, lethargy, lack of inquisitiveness and historic irresponsibility. 
It is not a question of the decision makers being convinced that war would 
not break out, but rather their conviction that the war would be short and 
that the war objectives would inevitably be achieved quickly. In places where 
analogies with the present-day or at least subsequent events (the way that 
strategic decisions were taken, for example) are possible as well as necessary, 
unfortunately there are none (with one exception). However, the analogy 
with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, from the standpoint of the relations 
of the military and political leadership and their crucial individuals in the 
decision-making process — a very interesting topic — is mentioned rather 
superficially. Even though the decision was to primarily follow individuals, 
MacMillan does not hesitate to allocate guilt for the war to peoples, i.e. 
countries. In her opinion, to blame for the war were Austria’s “mad determi-
nation” to destroy Serbia, Germany’s support to Austria’s war desires “to the 
hilt”, and Russia’s anxiousness to mobilise the army as soon as possible.
The book was obviously written under great pressure from the pub-
lisher that it be published at the prime time, in the year prior to the hun-
dredth anniversary of the breakout of the war. This is why, even though the 
book was not written quickly, the editor’s work has been carried out hastily 
and sloppily. That is the only explanation for mistakes such as the “European 
Community for Iron and Steel” (instead of European Community for Coal 
and Steel, p. 270), or the formulation according to which the legal coun-
cil of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “unfortunately” 
(probably for those who sent him, not for historiography) did not succeed 
in finding any facts regarding the involvement of the Serbian government 
in the assassination in Sarajevo (p. 538), and that instead of Franz Joseph 
(who appears in the picture above the text) the Austro-Hungarian monarch 
was labelled as Franz Ferdinand (p. 379). However, these oversights do not 
5 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers, Six months that Changed the World: The Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End the War (London: John Murrey, 2001).
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diminish the great value of the book. The sentences are completely clear, the 
dynamics of the text exceptional, drawing readers to the next page, which 
they turn with anticipation. The First World War was not inevitable, Mac-
Millan reiterates in this excellent book, it was brought about by people who 
did not realise what its nature would be, let alone what the consequences 
would be, and those who did have some idea did not have the courage to 
oppose the war (p. 605) — in both cases, people who were not up to chal-
lenges of the time they lived in.
The questions could be raised whether Emmerson’s book should have 
been included in this review at all. The reason for including it was that it 
is an interesting supplement to central contemporary historiography. The 
book offers a comprehensive description of the year 1913, the last year be-
fore the war. The author moves from country to country, i.e. from city to 
city, describing life in different places at the time. The book provides a se-
ries of images of peace that could have lasted another hundred years — it 
is almost a travel guide from a distant past. However, the attentive reader 
of this not especially interesting or comprehensive book can notice that 
there is a slow but certain change in the balance of power. Even though the 
European countries, i.e. their metropolises, are still the centre of the world, 
new countries on the fringes of this centre were slowly gaining strength, 
i.e. other peoples were growing stronger on the wave of the so-called first 
globalisation. These were primarily the U.S.A., as well as other countries 
on the American continents, certainly Japan, the almost unnoticed Austra-
lia (Down Under), and China’s potentials were slowly becoming apparent. 
Some of them, such as the U.S.A., will take Europe’s place in global affairs 
after the exhausting war on the continent and the appearance of destruc-
tive political projects, such as Fascism and Communism. The rise of some, 
especially China and India, will come considerably later, and the prospects 
of some, such as Argentina, will become significantly darker.
In many ways Hastings’ book differs from the others reviewed in 
this article. It is by far the closest to journalism, but the best journalism 
possible. There are no footnotes or references, and it includes many more 
personal stories “from the scene”, not only about the decision makers but 
also about common people, who, whether they wanted to or not — felt the 
consequences of these decisions. It is almost like a novel about the year 
1914, only both the characters and the events are real. The book is written 
in an elegant English language, the likes of which are slightly fading today, 
especially outside of the British Isles. As is the case with every novel, there 
are protagonists, individuals as well as peoples, good and bad, only all are 
tragedians — it is no wonder that the title of his book is Catastrophe.
Hastings has no dilemmas and moral relativism is not acceptable to 
him: the First World War was a war between good and evil. Evil is embodied 
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in Germany, in every respect. Not only is Germany guilty for the beginning 
of the war, but its elite started it in order to achieve German political domi-
nation over the peoples of Europe. For Hastings, as opposed to the other 
authors, another dilemma simply does not exist — Fischer was absolutely 
right. War occurred because there was a German political plan for that war. 
All those that fought against Germany in that war represent good.
The Serbs are given by Hastings a special place among those on the 
side of good, disproportionate to their military and especially economic 
power, and with deep respect. To the British readers Hastings explains, 
since he is slightly less interested in others, that the Serbs were to Austria-
Hungary what the Irish were to Britain in the twentieth century. The only 
difference is that Britain proved to be resilient, the author adds. Hastings is 
the only one of the authors to show how the year 1914 and what followed 
it were tragic for Serbia. Specifying that one in six residents of Serbia was 
killed during the war, Hastings concludes that Austria did in fact succeed in 
punishing Serbia for the death of Franz Ferdinand. However, the price for 
that punishment was the self-destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
In fact, the clash between Austria and Serbia, as depicted by Hastings, is a 
Shakespearean embrace of two enemies, neither of which can get out of it. 
In present-day language, the interests were so opposed to each other that 
no compromise could be reached. It was only later, with the wrong political 
decisions of the Serbian elite, that Serbs became aware of the long-term 
consequences of these horrific human losses that Hastings mentions.
Drina, Liège, Tannenberg, Marne, Ypres all appear as in the chapters 
of Hastings’ novel, ending with the “the Serbs’ last triumph” (the Battle of 
Kolubara) and what marked the end of 1914 “in the field” — life (for those 
that were so lucky) in the muddy trenches. It is a quite expected content for 
a book by a military historian such as Hastings. However, the reader might 
be somewhat disappointed by the treatment of the Battle of Tannenberg 
— there is too little material on this extremely important event. This cata-
strophic Russian defeat, from which the Imperial Army never recovered, 
brought about by the epochal incompetence and arrogance of the officers 
of the Imperial Army, and not by any special exceptionality of the German 
army, regardless of other consequences, fortified the myth of the invincibil-
ity of this army and the Prussian aristocracy, with von Hindenburg as the 
role model. The first myth was destroyed exactly thirty years later, relatively 
near Tannenberg, on the Eastern Front. The only difference is that it was no 
longer the Imperial Army on the other side, but rather the Red Army. And 
there was no armistice, like the one in 1918. The second myth was destroyed 
by the unobstructed political rise and survival of Nazism.
With this book Hastings proves that he is a member of the “old 
guard”, the one that apparently is slowly disappearing. This is a man who 
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still believes that we can and must draw a line between good and evil, and 
that the attempt to understand something or someone does not mean that 
we should also inevitably justify them. This is a man who considers courage, 
commitment to ideals, loyalty and sacrifice for others to be virtues. This is a 
man who believes that patriotism is not passé and that freedom represents 
one of the pillars of the dignity of human existence. This is a man who 
apparently does not know the meaning of the expression “political correct-
ness”. Hats off to him!
In his first book, of the two that are included in this review, Mc-
Meekin tries to show which is the main party guilty for the First World 
War, but not the only guilty party — none other than Russia. This is done 
from the position of the Turkish Empire and the great injustice that was 
done to it by breaking up the formerly powerful empire. McMeekin believes 
that it is precisely Russia that should be declared the main scavenger. The 
finger is pointed at the duplicitous Sazonov, as though duplicity in politics 
was a Russian invention that this empire had monopoly over. However, if 
Russia wanted the war so badly, what then is the explanation for the assess-
ments by the German General Staff that it was not until after 1916 that 
Russia was ready for war (this is how long it took to lay railway tracks in the 
so-called Polish bulge). Also, what is the explanation for the catastrophic 
defeat of the aggressor country in the first battle of Tannenberrg — usually 
the aggressor scores victories against the unprepared adversary in the early 
days of war, at least the Germans have experience in this.
This extremely unusual thesis about the sole Russian guilt for the 
breakout of the First World War was presented by McMeekin in this cha-
otically and unsystematically written book, in an attempt to defend it with 
confusing arguments, with the ever-present desire to distinguish in Man-
ichaean style the evil Russia, the aggressor, and good Turkey, the victim of 
aggression. It seems that the Western Front did not exist for McMeekin. 
It is as though also non-existent was the German war plan, according to 
which the focus of operations was on the Western Front. It is as though the 
Battle of the Marne did not take place. Russia’s sole guilt would be a Co-
pernican Revolution in the perception of the causes of the First World War, 
and McMeekin, a young and anonymous author prior to this book, trades 
precisely on that fact. Proving or disproving Germany’s guilt is something 
that is usual, it has been going on for a long time, but exclusive Russian 
guilt  —  that would certainly contribute to the publicity of the book and 
its author. However, one should remember that the Copernican Revolution 
occurred because Copernicus was right.
The author published a second book in the same year, practically a 
daily chronicle of the last days of peace, in which he examines things in a 
completely different way. There are no more evil, duplicitous, cunning and 
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self-confident Russians, but rather all the decision makers are now ordinary 
human beings, with all their limitations. One should not waste any more 
words on McMeekin’s contribution to contemporary historiography.
Christopher Clark became the main star of the new historiographic 
cycle with his book The Sleepwalkers, which has become widely known. It is 
likely that one of the reasons for this is that in this book the entwinement of 
the fields of history and international relations is quite clear, perhaps clearer 
than in any other of the reviewed books.
However, let s start from the beginning. Already at the very beginning 
of the book Clark states that the book “is concerned less with why the war 
happened than with how it came about.” His explanation is unconvincing 
— he believes that the answer to the question “why invites us to go in search 
of remote and categorical causes: imperialism, nationalism, armaments, al-
liances, high finance,” etc. It remains unclear what then should be the focus 
of historiography if it does not address these issues. The methodological 
problem is clear, independent of this: such a dissection is understandable 
in certain areas (the separation of procedural law and substantive law, for 
example), but to analytically answer the question how, without analysing 
the why, certainly represents nothing more than an ordinary chronology, 
like the one presented by McMeekin, and that is certainly not worthy of 
mention in a review of historiographic works. Even though Clark tones 
down his stance a bit later, he defends it by citing the stance of Bulgarian 
historian Budinov “once we pose the question ‘why’, guilt becomes the focal 
point”. Things are somewhat clearer now: such a methodological procedure 
allows for the elegant circumventing of Fischer’s thesis on the German guilt 
for the war, as well as the guilt of its allies, such as Bulgaria. This is why the 
conclusion that no one was guilty for the First World War: “The outbreak 
of war was a tragedy, not a crime” (p. 561).
At the very beginning of the book Clark also presents a second inter-
esting hypothesis — the First World War was not the consequences of any 
long-term deterioration of international elations, “but of short-term shocks 
to the international system”. However, the problem is that well-organised 
international relations are resistant to short-term shock — they are resistant 
to stress-tests. If short-term shocks toppled the international system, it was 
not resistant to such shocks, which speaks enough about its vulnerability. 
And things become even more absurd when at the end of the book we learn 
from the author what these short-term shocks were: the creation of the 
Albanian state, the Russian diplomatic reorientation from Sofia to Belgrade 
(p. 557), and of course — the shots fired in Sarajevo. In line with the stated 
logic the absurd conclusion follows: the reason for the slaughter at Verdun 
was the creation of the Albanian state. However, such a methodological ap-
proach allows the author to circumvent a serious analysis of everything that 
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MacMillan had analysed: the long-term changes in relations between the 
great powers, which led to the establishment of a system of international re-
lations, which were so deteriorated that Europe was constantly on the brink 
of war. None of this exists in Clark’s book. Therefore German war guilt can-
not exist whatsoever. And all that under the slogan “How, not why!”
The greatest weakness of Clark’s book is the lack of arguments for his 
apodictic claims, i.e. their inconvincibility, if he even presents them at all. 
For example, Clark says that “In any case, it was not the building of German 
ships after 1898 that propelled Britain into closer relations with France 
and Russia.” Without any evidence! Not even the fact that naval domina-
tion was crucial for Britain’s national security, nor the clearly demonstrated 
British tolerance toward the growth of the navies of distant countries (the 
U.S.A. and Japan), nor the thought that Britain could feel threatened by the 
huge modern navy not far from its shores, nor the absence of any reason for 
Germany’s aggressive program of maritime armament — none of this fazes 
Clark. Germany is not guilty and that’s it. There’s nothing to prove there!
Even more interesting it the treatment of the famous meeting of the 
Imperial War Council in 1912, which authorities consider the event that 
confirmed Germany’s aggressive war intentions, embodied in the position 
of so-called preventive war, before future opponents, primarily Russia, gain 
military strength.6 The key historic source on the content of the meeting is 
the journal entry of Admiral von Müller, the Chief of the German Imperial 
Naval Cabinet, practically chief of staff of the German navy. Clark claims 
that this meeting had no significance, and in support of this he cites the 
conclusion from von Müller’s journali entry that the result of the meeting 
“amounted to almost nothing”. The problem is that Clark does not even 
try to consider what Admiral von Müller’s expectations were, and based 
on what criteria he made the conclusion that he entered in his journal. It 
is reasonable to assume that the Chief of the Imperial Naval Cabinet was 
interested in operational issues related to the navy preparing for war: how 
many new ships would be outfitted, how recruitment would increase the 
human potential, how the new personnel would be trained. Admirals are in 
fact not interested in political conclusions, but formal operational decisions 
related to the navy that they command. If we look at Admiral von Müller’s 
notes in this light, it becomes clear that his lapidary conclusion was (likely) 
not related to the political result of the meeting, and only such a result is 
relevant from the point of view of historiographic analysis. This was not ne-
glected by MacMillan, who notes in von Müller’s record that von Moltke’s 
concurred that war was unavoidable and his  words “War the sooner the 
6 See J.C.G. Röhl, “Admiral von Müller and the Approach of War, 1911–1914”, The 
Historical Journal vol. 12, 651–673.
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better”, and the Kaiser’s position that Germany would have to go to war 
against Great Britain and France together (p. 479).
The weakness of Clark’s arguments, where there are any, is a general 
feature of his opus. For example, in his history of Prussia one can find the 
claim that the Soviet authorities had greater understanding for the Prus-
sian aristocracy than the Western allies did, differentiating between them 
and the Nazis, which the Western allies did not do, wanting to destroy 
Prussia as the cradle of German militarism.7 The argument supporting this 
claim can be found in the fact that Soviet media, unlike Western media, 
expressed sympathies for the conspirators who tried to eliminate Hitler, 
and that the Soviet authorities tried to organise German units that would 
fight against the German army, commended by Prussian offices, within the 
National Committee for a Free Germany. The only thing that Clark ig-
nores is that this is a totalitarian government, where propaganda comes first 
(as is the case in their totalitarian Nazi opponent — previously ally, before 
the war — with the propaganda project based on General Vlasov and his 
Army) and which took this project to be a propaganda victory. The Western 
allies did not engage in propaganda, but rather in the destruction of Prus-
sian militarism, which is why they had no need for such gestures. And the 
extent to which the Soviet authorities truly differentiated between Nazism 
and Prussian militarism, and to what extent they perceived virtues in the 
Prussian aristocracy, is best apparent in the ferocity with which that entire 
area was destroyed towards the end of the war and the tenacity with which 
all Prussians were forced out. Of course, none of that is important to Clark 
— he still believes that the Russians/Soviets saw virtue where no one else 
did, perhaps excluding himself. Someone had some understanding for his 
beloved Prussia, even if that someone was Stalin!
Clark has an interesting analysis of the transformation of the Euro-
pean multipolar system of alliances, which was based on the German con-
cept of loose alliance with neighbours, into a bipolar world that led to the 
breakout of war. Of course, Clark is correct when he says that this bipolar 
system was necessary but not a sufficient condition, i.e. that it did not cause 
the war. He surprisingly successfully explains his view by pointing out the 
fact that Cold War bipolar world did not lead to a global war. Clark is 
correct when he explains that after Hiroshima and Nagasaki the decision 
makers and general public had no illusions about how a nuclear war would 
be conducted and what would be its consequences. In this sense Clark is 
correct that the decision makers in 1914 were sleepwalking. Even though 
7 Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom, The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947 (Allan 
Lane, Penguin Books, 2006), 674.
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they knew they were going to war, most of the decision makers had no idea 
what kind of war awaited them.
The way that secondary historical sources are used in Clark’s book 
is quite problematic. For example, Clark states, citing Bulgarian historian 
Teodorov, that after the First Balkan War Crown Prince Alexander toured 
various “Macedonian towns in the conquered areas” and spoke to “local 
Bulgars” in the following way. “What are you?” “Bulgarian.” “You are not 
Bulgarian. Fuck your father.”8 The credibility of the source is yet to be veri-
fied. Not everything that was ever published is appropriate for quotation 
— this is the advice to those who are preparing for a career in science, but 
Clark apparently does not abide by it. And the detailed recount of portions 
of the memoires of a 26-year-old (therefore novice) French diplomat, Louis 
de Robien (pp. 433–435), on his experiences upon arriving in St. Petersburg, 
including his assessment of the local cuisine, is not only completely irrele-
vant, but is apparently supposed to serve to show that at the time Russia was 
a backward country and a country of Orthodox fundamentalism, in order to 
discredit the Russian side in 1914, especially in the eyes of the present-day 
more superficial readers, in whom the word fundamentalism elicits an as-
sociation with Iran and some other present-day evils.
However, the question may be raised why The Sleepwalkers, a book 
with so many methodological deficiencies, has achieved such success that 
many people worldwide believe it to be a synonym for contemporary global 
historiography on the topic of the First World War. This is no coincidence; 
it is a very well-written book. The style is suitable, keeping the reader on 
edge, the right measure of connection with secondary historical sources has 
been made, and parallels with the present are such that it grasps the atten-
tion of the readers who are not so interested in the period a century ago — 
Clark is obviously an experienced author. The Sleepwalkers is a bad, but very 
well-written book — one might even say skilfully written.
Fromkin’s book, even though published nearly a decade ago, has still 
made it into the selection for this review for its contributions to the field of 
international relations more than historiography, and for the very clearly ex-
pressed theses about the causes of the First World War. Fromkin points out 
one of the very important characteristics of the Triple Alliance, the alliance 
that Germany was in — the links between the allies were asymmetrical. The 
indubitable pillar of this alliance was Germany and its commitment to its al-
lies was unquestionable. The other two allies, Austria and especially Italy, had 
less strength, military as well as economic, and were less reliable partners, i.e. 
with less commitment to the alliance and the obligations stemming from it. 
8 Clark quotes (44 in chapter 5) Ivan T. Teodorov, Balkanskite voini (1912–1913): Is-
toricheski, diplomaticheski i strategichaski ocherk (Sofia 2007), 259–261.
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The German leaders simply did not know how their allies would act when 
hard times came around, since they had not received a single credible signal 
from them regarding the acceptance of the agreed obligations. Judging that 
the alliance with Italy was a dead letter (time would prove that this was a 
good assessment) the German authorities knew that it was crucial that at 
least Austria-Hungary be their ally, otherwise they would be alone, between 
France and Russia. This is why it was crucial that they secure this alliance.
Fromkin believes that the best way for that was for Austria (From-
kin writes about Austria, not referring to Austria-Hungary, likely implicitly 
pointing out the asymmetry in the adoption of foreign policy and military 
decisions) to attack Serbia, because then it would have to seek Germany’s 
protection from Russia, Serbia’s ally, i.e. protector. This is precisely how 
Fromkin interprets Germany giving Austria a free hand in early July 1914, 
and even Germany’s dissatisfaction with the slow preparations for the war 
against Serbia, i.e. encouragement to speed up the start of the war. Simply, 
the moment that Austria is at war with Serbia, because of the Russian threat 
there would be no thought of abandoning the alliance with Germany, which 
is of crucial importance for the integrity of the German Eastern Front.
From this it follows that there was a strategic conformity between 
Austrian and German interests. Both countries wanted war: Austria against 
Serbia, and it was not interested in anything else, and Germany against 
Russia, with a preventive war on the Western Front, so that after the defeat 
of France, the entire German military force could focus on Russia. Therefore 
the Austrian alliance on the Eastern Front was of strategic importance to 
Germany in the defensive phase, i.e. until France was defeated and kicked 
out of the game. It takes two to keep the peace, Fromkin writes, but only 
one to start a war — the one that wants to start it; the other side does not 
have much choice. He considers the First World War to be Austrian and 
German, however Austria wanted a local war, in accordance with its capaci-
ties.
In Fromkin’s book, as well as in several others reviewed, there is tes-
timony of one of the possible implications of the Sarajevo assassination. The 
victim of this assassination was a person that many believed was opposed to a 
war against Serbia. It appears that Franz Ferdinand was aware that Austria-
Hungary could not survive a war, that it was too weak a state structure. We 
will probably never learn the truth about this, but as Fromkin states, at the 
moment when the Austrian army moved against Serbia, Austrian Chief of 
the General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf admitted “Had the Archduke still 
been alive, he would have had me shot” (p. 302). However, he was no more.
Annika Mombauer’s book is included in this review because it pres-
ents a review of the history of revision of the historiography on Germany’s 
war guilt, clearly showing how the issue of this guilt exceeds the histo-
riograpic, i.e. academic frame. This is a serious political issue. Namely, there 
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probably is not a country in the world with such a heavy historical heritage 
as Germany. Since no one can dispute Germany’s guilt for the beginning of 
the Second World War — this matter is quite clear — the question is raised 
as to the continuity of Germany’s aggressive policy and militarism, rooted in 
the German state up to 1945, which inevitably stems from Fischer’s thesis. 
Mombauer showed how the German the academic and non-academic pub-
lic reacted to the appearance of Fischer’s thesis, and how it was possible that 
Fischer’s controversy led to him being denied financial support for travel-
ling to a series of lectures in the U.S.A. solely based on his historiographic 
findings, i.e. the views that he argued. This is best apparent from the excerpt 
from Gerhard Ritter, Fischer’s main opponent, and his thesis: “...if [the war] 
was caused solely or primarily by the excessive political ambition of our na-
tion…, and has recently been affirmed by some German historians, then our 
national historical consciousness darkens even further than has already been 
the case through the experiences of the Hitler times!.”9 Indeed, the question 
emerges as to what historiography should be addressing. As Mombauer 
writes that Ritter, feeling secure in himself, explained that “it is the task 
of the historian to help elevate the political image of the nation about the 
nation by presenting the history that this nation creates” (p. 120). Fischer 
obviously had a different vision of his task — the search for the truth. And 
this is where Fischer’s superiority over his most aggressive critics emerges. 
In a slightly altered form, one that does not dispute Germany’s war guilt, 
regardless of whether there was a concrete political plan before the war, this 
thesis survived to the time when Mombauer published her book (2002).
And at the end of this review, one should point out that the word 
“understand” has two different meaning. One is the meaning of compre-
hension of the sense, i.e. apprehension of cause and effect relationships, 
implying value-neutral answers to questions of why and how. I believe that 
it is the task of every science, including historiography, to address such “un-
derstanding”, i.e. the comprehension of reality as it is, i.e. in the case of 
historiography — as it was. The other meaning is in the sense of justifica-
tion, i.e. having understanding for someone or something. This is a matter 
of value judgements, which inevitably leads to the creation of a heritage 
of national awareness, which is so dear to Ritter, regardless of whose it is, 
ours or theirs. This is something that is not, or at least should not be, part 
of science. Unfortunately, a great portion of the works went into justifying 
someone or something, and not the cognition what, why and how happened 
exactly a hundred years ago.
9 Gerhard Ritter, Der erste Weltkrieg (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
1964), 138. Quoted based on Mark Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World 
War (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 224.
